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Increasing Police Accountability: Restoring Trust and 
Legitimacy Through the Appointment of Independent 
Prosecutors 
Kami Chavis Simmons

 
INTRODUCTION 
Immediately following the shooting death of Michael Brown in 
Ferguson, Missouri and the death of Eric Gardner at the hands of a 
New York City Police Department officer, criminal justice advocates 
called for greater measures to hold police officers accountable for 
their actions.
1
 For many observers, the failure to secure criminal 
indictments against the officers involved in each of these deaths of 
unarmed citizens suggested various shortcomings in the criminal 
justice system.
2
 In the wake of these and other deaths, President 
Obama signed an order establishing the President’s Task Force on 
21st Century Policing, a body of scholars, practitioners, and 
policymakers that would examine ways to improve trust between 
communities and police.
3
 Yet in the weeks following the release of 
 
  Professor of Law and Director of the Criminal Justice Program, Wake Forest 
University School of Law. B.A. University of North Carolina; J.D. Harvard Law School. I 
would like to thank Ashley Brompton and Amanda Whorton for providing valuable research 
assistance.  
 1. More than a dozen states are considering legislation aimed at increasing police 
accountability following the deaths. Reid Wilson, Police Accountability Measures Flood State 
Legislatures After Ferguson, Staten Island, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.washington 
post.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2015/02/04/police-accountability-measures-flood-state-legislatures-
after-ferguson-staten-island/. 
 2. See, e.g., Katrina vanden Heuvel, Fixing a Broken Justice System, WASH. POST (Dec. 
16, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/katrina-vanden-heuvel-fixing-a-broken-
justice-system/2014/12/16/76239b2e-8496-11e4-b9b7-b8632ae73d25_story.html. 
 3. Establishment of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 79 Fed. Reg. 
246 (Dec. 23, 2014), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-12-23/pdf/2014-
30195.pdf; President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED 
POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/policingtaskforce (last 
visited May 28, 2015). 
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the Task Force’s report, a North Charleston, South Carolina police 
officer fatally shot Walter Scott in the back, and vigorous protests 
erupted in Baltimore, Maryland after Freddie Gray died of injuries he 
sustained while in police custody.
4
 These deaths have reignited many 
debates about a myriad of reform proposals that police accountability 
experts have been discussing for decades. For example, reformers 
have urged more officer training focused on de-escalation techniques 
and cultural or racial bias.
5
 Others called for greater statistical 
tracking to measure the breadth of the problem of officer-involved 
deaths.
6
 Yet another hotly contested reform proposal involves 
requiring police officers to wear body cameras.
7
 The NAACP, the 
ACLU, and The Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law 
have supported initiatives requiring police to wear body cameras.
8
 In 
 
 4. Michael S. Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, South Carolina Officer Is Charged With Murder 
of Walter Scott, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/us/south-
carolina-officer-is-charged-with-murder-in-black-mans-death.html; Scott Malone, Ian Simpson 
& Warren Strobel, Marchers Protest Police Violence in Baltimore, New York, REUTERS (Apr. 
30, 2015, 2:53 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-police-baltimore-idUSKBN0NI1N 
720150430. It is argued by some that special prosecutors can dampen or eliminate real and 
perceived conflicts of interest that occur when a local office prosecutes a police officer. See, 
e.g., Editorial, Police Abuse Cases Need Special Prosecutors, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/police-abuse-cases-need-special-prosecutors/2014/12/ 
06/fcf57e28-7cd6-11e4-b821-503cc7efed9e_story.html. 
 5. MICHAEL D. WHITE, POLICE OFFICER BODY-WORN CAMERAS: ASSESSING THE 
EVIDENCE 10 (2014), available at https://www.ojpdiagnosticcenter.org/sites/default/files/spotlight/ 
download/Police%20Officer%20Body-Worn%20Cameras.pdf. See also LINDSAY MILLER, 
JESSICA TOLIVER & POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN 
CAMERA PROGRAM: RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 48 (2014), available at 
http://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p296-pub.pdf. 
 6. See Arron C. Davis & Wesley Lowery, FBI Director Calls Lack of Data on Police 
Shootings “Ridiculous,” “Embarrassing,” WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.washington 
post.com/national/fbi-director-calls-lack-of-data-on-police-shootings-ridiculous-embarrassing/ 
2015/10/07/c0ebaf7a-6d16-11e5-b31c-d80d62b53e28_story.html. 
 7. See James S. Muller, To Police the Police, Body Cameras are a Must, L.A. TIMES 
(May 11, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-muller-body-camera-data-shows-
unnecessary-force-20150508-story.html. But see Janet Vertesi, The Problem with Police Body 
Cameras, TIME (May 4, 2015), http://time.com/3843157/the-problem-with-police-body-
cameras/. 
 8. See Civil Rights Coalition Urges National Reforms and Recommendations to Address 
Police Abuse, NAT’L ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, http://www.naacp. 
org/press/entry/civil-rightscoalition-continues-to-urge-national-reforms-and-recommendation (last 
visited May 30, 2015) (describing the Department of Justice’s National Initiative for Building 
Community Trust and Justice and providing statements from the ACLU, Lawyers’ Committee, 
and NAACP supporting the program).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol49/iss1/11
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addition, President Obama has proposed that $75 million of federal 
money be made available for local law enforcement to purchase and 
train officers to use body cameras.
9
 Many of these reforms may result 
in additional transparency about deaths or serious injuries suffered in 
police custody, assist in identifying structural failures and 
opportunities to enhance training, and lead to more effective policy 
solutions. However, the aforementioned police accountability 
measures may not result in punishment of individual officers who 
have employed excessive force, because even when seemingly 
damning evidence exists, prosecutions of officers have traditionally 
been rare and even when officers are prosecuted, convictions are 
difficult to secure.
10
 
Amid the calls for accountability, recent public outrage reached a 
fever pitch when officers were not held criminally responsible for 
recent high-profile deaths. Numerous advocates noted that local 
prosecutors face inherent conflicts of interest and for this reason, 
these advocates call for independent agencies or special prosecutors 
to prosecute these cases. In particular, the St. Louis County District 
Attorney Bob McCulloch received numerous requests to recuse 
himself from the prosecution of Officer Darren Wilson for fear that 
he would not vigorously seek an indictment.
11
 Indeed, once the grand 
jury declined to indict Wilson, critics combed the grand jury 
 
 9. Nolan Feeney, Obama Requests Funds for Police Body Cameras to Address 
‘Simmering Distrust’ After Ferguson, TIME (Dec. 1, 2014), http://time.com/3613058/obama-
ferguson-police-body-cameras-funding/. 
 10. Only forty-one police officers were charged with homicide for an on-duty shooting 
from 2004 to 2011. Zusha Elinson & Joe Palazzolo, Police Rarely Criminally Charged for On-
Duty Shootings, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 24, 2014, 7:22 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/police-
rarely-criminally-charged-for-on-duty-shootings-1416874955. 
 11. These calls for recusal are based on the fact that McCulloch’s father was a police 
officer and was shot and killed by an African American man. Leigh Ann Caldwell, Concerns 
Arise About Prosecutor in Michael Brown Case, CNN (Aug. 20, 2014, 12:48 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/19/us/ferguson-prosecutor-mcculloch/. For a discussion of the 
racial make-up of Ferguson and historic racism in St. Louis, see Wesley Lowery, Carol D. 
Leonnig & Mark Berman, Even Before Michael Brown’s Slaying in Ferguson, Racial Questions 
Hung Over Police, WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
even-before-teen-michael-browns-slaying-in-mo-racial-questions-have-hung-over-police/2014/ 
08/13/78b3c5c6-2307-11e4-86ca-6f03cbd15c1a_story.html. 
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testimony to critique McCulloch’s strategy.12 Similarly, Staten Island 
District Attorney Daniel Donovan faced criticism over his failure to 
indict the officer whose chokehold killed Eric Garner, despite the 
existence of videotaped footage in that case.
13
 There was a sense that 
many had lost faith in their local prosecutors to be able to set aside 
their close relationships with local law enforcement in order to 
conduct a fair trial of police officers engaged in alleged misconduct 
and excessive use of force.
14
 In contrast, jubilant crowds flooded the 
streets of Baltimore when the chief prosecutor, Marilyn Mosby, 
revealed numerous charges against six officers involved in the death 
of Freddie Gray.
15
 Shortly thereafter, many who supported of the 
officers called for Mosby’s recusal citing her political ties and 
criticized the swiftness of her office in levying charges against the 
officers.
16
 McCulloch, who is white and whose constituents are 
largely white, was criticized because he failed to secure an indictment 
for killing an unarmed black man.
17
 Mosby, on the other hand, who is 
African American, was criticized for bringing charges and there was 
a suggestion that she was merely appeasing a largely black 
constituency, as well as trying to quell the violence that had broken 
out in several of Baltimore’s black neighborhoods.18 Each of these 
cases demonstrates that the criminal prosecution of law enforcement 
 
 12. See David Zucchino, Prosecutor’s Grand Jury Strategy in Ferguson Case Adds to 
Controversy, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2014, 8:49 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-
ferguson-da-analysis-20141126-story.html. 
 13. Alexander Burns, Daniel Donovan Gets Wary Welcome to Congress After Eric 
Garner Case, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/23/nyregion/ 
daniel-donovan-gets-a-wary-welcome-to-congress-after-eric-garner-case.html?_r=0. 
 14. Walter Katz, Enhancing Accountability and Trust with Independent Investigations of 
Police Lethal Force, 128 HARV. L. REV. 235, 236–37 (2015), available at http://cdn.harvardlaw 
review.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/vol128_Katz.pdf (noting that “[t]he Brown and Garner 
cases embodied not only general distrust between police and minority communities, but also the 
loss of the public’s trust in the investigations and reviews of police-involved deaths.”). 
 15. Alan Blinder & Richard Pérez-Peña, 6 Baltimore Police Officers Charged in Freddie 
Gray Death, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/02/us/freddie-gray-
autopsy-report-given-to-baltimore-prosecutors.html?_r=0. 
 16. See Peter Hermann & Lynh Bui, Defense Lawyers: Marilyn Mosby Should Recuse 
Herself from Gray Case, WASH. POST (May 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/ 
crime/defense-marilyn-mosby-should-recuse-herself-from-freddie-gray-case/2015/05/08/d701c 
51c-f5c8-11e4-bcc4-e8141e5eb0c9_story.html. 
 17. See Jeffrey Toobin, How Not to Use a Grand Jury, NEW YORKER (Nov. 25, 2014), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/use-grand-jury. 
 18. See Hermann & Bui, supra note 16.  
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officers is fraught with actual or potential conflicts of interest and 
political issues that threaten to undermine the legitimacy of the 
criminal justice system. These issues become more acute when one 
considers the implications for racial minorities who have a 
longstanding distrust of the criminal justice system. In each instance, 
various segments of the local community criticized the local 
prosecutor for their actions based on potential conflicts of interest. In 
either case, the appointment of an independent prosecutor might have 
alleviated the appearance of impropriety and led to greater 
confidence in the criminal justice process for both the victims and the 
police defendants. 
Criminal prosecution of police officers raises a myriad of issues 
that this Article will begin to explore. First, while there has been a 
paradigmatic shift in police accountability in recent decades from 
remedies focusing on individual officers to those focusing on broad 
organizational reform, this Article will explore the important role that 
the deterrence rationale of criminal prosecution might play as one 
tool to address police misconduct. Second, other than deterrence, 
criminal prosecutions serve numerous goals, including retribution for 
the harms imposed upon the victims and society for the crimes. 
Historically, many racial minorities, when compared with their white 
counterparts, lack faith in equity and fairness of the criminal justice 
system.
19
 Recent deaths of unarmed blacks at the hands of police and 
what many see as a failure to hold the officers accountable, and have 
yet again exposed the racial dynamics at play within the criminal 
justice system. Part I of this paper summarizes the various tools 
currently used to keep police officers accountable for their actions, 
and contextualizes criminal prosecution as one tool in the toolkit of 
police accountability—one blade on the Swiss-army knife needed to 
achieve effective and sustainable police accountability. Part II will 
argue that the current manner in which many local prosecutions 
proceed, which is replete with potential (and inherent) conflicts of 
interest, undermines both the deterrence rationale and public 
confidence in whether both victims and police officers are treated 
 
 19. Bill Schneider, Do Americans Trust Their Cops to Be Fair and Just? New Poll 
Contains Surprises., REUTERS (Jan. 15, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/01/ 
15/one-third-of-americans-believe-police-lie-routinely/.  
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fairly when local prosecutors are responsible for investigating and 
deciding whether to criminally charge officers. This part will explore 
the challenges and dangerous implications of the current model. Part 
III of this Article will explore the merits of several proposals to 
reform this process, focusing primarily upon the appointment of 
independent prosecutors rather than local ones to investigate and 
prosecute police-involved deaths.
20
  
I. ASSESSING CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AS A PROPER TOOL IN THE 
POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TOOLKIT 
The deaths of Michael Brown, Eric Gardner, Walter Scott, and 
Freddie Gray at the hands of police have become symbolic of the 
need for increased police accountability in the United States. 
Although there is no comprehensive national database on police-
involved shootings, one group estimates that in 2015 there were 1138 
deaths at the hands of police.
21
 One study showed that 490 people 
were killed by police between January and June 11, 2015, and that 
138 of the victims were African American (which means that 
although blacks constitute 12 percent of the U.S. population, they 
accounted for nearly 30 percent of those killed by police officers in 
the first half of this past year).
22 Between January and August 2015, 
police killed 55 unarmed African Americans and the rates of police 
violence are much higher against African Americans (7.18 per 
million) versus whites (2.92 per million).
23
 In a 2014 study, New 
York City’s Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) found that 
 
 20. Following the failure of the grand juries to indict the police officers involved in deaths 
of both Michael Brown and Eric Gardner, some critics argued that independent prosecutors 
should be appointed to replace the decision making power of grand juries in these cases. This 
paper does not explore models a model that would usurp the power of the grand jury, but rather 
examines the merits and disadvantages of appointing an independent prosecutor to investigate 
or prosecute the case rather than the local prosecutor.  
 21. This number is accurate as of December 22, 2015. The Counted: People Killed by 
Police in the U.S., THE GUARDIAN, http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/ 
jun/01/the-counted-police-killings-us-database (last visited Dec. 22, 2015) [hereinafter The 
Counted]. 
 22. Peniel E. Joseph, The Number of Times African-Americans Were Brutalized by Police 
This Year, REUTERS (June 11, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/06/11/the-
number-times-black-people-were-brutalized-by-police-this-year-unknown/. 
 23. The Counted, supra note 21.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol49/iss1/11
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015]  Increasing Police Accountability 143 
 
 
while African Americans made up 23 percent of the city’s 
population, they represented 55 percent of reported victims of alleged 
misconduct from 2008 to 2013.
24
 
As the recent events make clear, these individual acts of police 
violence demonstrate that these events often are symptomatic of a 
larger problem plaguing local police departments nationwide. It is 
well-established that police violence is generally a product of 
organizational or institutional factors that influence police 
departments rather than individual officers. Thus, effective remedies 
need to strike at the heart of police culture in order to deter 
misconduct of individual police officers, but should also address 
systemic issues within these institutions that might contribute to 
police misconduct.  
A. The Current “Toolkit” to Address Police Misconduct 
Throughout history, numerous remedies aimed at curbing police 
misconduct and increasing accountability have included both external 
and internal mechanisms. Internal remedies such as internal 
investigations are fraught with conflicts, but external oversight 
measures such as citizen review boards have also faced criticism.
25
 
Court-sanctioned remedies such as the exclusionary rule also have 
proved inadequate to address police misconduct.
26
 While civil actions 
against officers might offer compensation to a few successful victims, 
these suits have not spurred widespread reforms.
27
 The recent deaths 
of unarmed citizens in police custody have also sparked new 
discussions about the merits and efficacy of criminal prosecutions of 
 
 24. N.Y.C. CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BD., 2013 REPORT (2014), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/downloads/pdf/CCRB%20Annual_2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/M3 
7N-L5BR]. 
 25. See, e.g., James R. Hudson, Police Review Boards and Police Accountability, 36 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 515, 521 (1971). 
 26. Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 
STAN. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009). 
 27. For the amount of money jurisdictions spend on civil cases, see Zusha Elinson & Dan 
Frosch, Cost of Police-Misconduct Cases Soars in Big U.S. Cities, WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2015, 
10:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/cost-of-police-misconduct-cases-soars-in-big-u-s-cities-
1437013834 (noting that the “10 cities with the largest police departments paid out $248.7 
million last year in settlements and court judgments in police-misconduct cases, up 48% from 
$163.3 million in 2010. . . .”). 
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police officers.
28
 It seems clear that new tools are needed in order to 
protect citizens, especially the most vulnerable, from the increasingly 
visible transgressions of the police. 
B. Why are State and Federal Criminal Prosecutions of Law 
Enforcement Officers So Rare? 
Although the recent trend in policing has focused upon 
organizational change and forward-looking reforms to prevent future 
instances of police misconduct, police officers who may have acted 
outside of the legal boundaries to effectuate a stop, search, or arrest 
of a subject can face criminal prosecution either at the state or the 
federal level. The deaths of Michael Brown, Eric Garner, and others 
have also caused a public outcry for criminal prosecution of the 
officers involved in those deaths, and the failure of prosecutors to 
secure indictments in either of these cases has highlighted the 
shortcomings of criminal prosecution as a viable tool to address 
police misconduct. While advocates continue to press for widespread 
changes in law enforcement practices, there has also been an 
increased focus on examining the current models of criminally 
prosecuting officers. Criminal prosecutions of police officers are 
uncommon and judges and juries often exonerate the few officers 
who face prosecution.
29
  
But what accounts for the failure to prosecute or convict police 
officers accused of using excessive force? The failure to indict 
officers in Michael Brown’s death and the death of Eric Garner 
renewed the debate about why police officers rarely face criminal 
charges for their roles in police-related deaths. Many experts note 
that there is an “inherent conflict of interest that exists between the 
prosecutors’ offices and the police officers upon whose work the 
 
 28. See Kimberly Kindy & Kimbriell Kelly, Thousands Dead, Few Prosecuted, WASH. 
POST (Apr. 11, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/04/11/thousands-
dead-few-prosecuted/. 
 29. State criminal prosecutions resulting from violations of state laws against assault, 
aggravated assault, manslaughter and murder are another method of holding police officers 
accountable. See John V. Jacobi, Prosecuting Police Misconduct, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 789, 803 
(2000) (discussing the reluctance of police officers to pursue investigations of fellow officers’ 
misconduct) [hereinafter Jacobi].  
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prosecutors rely.”30 It has long been argued that the primary reason 
local prosecutors are hesitant to pursue cases that involve police 
officers is due to the close relationships between prosecutors and 
officers.
31
 Although prosecutors conduct the investigations alone and 
officers respond to the crimes alone, they depend on each other and 
work as a team.
32
 Prosecutors depend on officers for information, 
witnesses, and evidence making their relationships ongoing.
33
 The 
potential conflicts of interest extend beyond the ability to secure 
police witnesses for trials. For example, more than 80 percent of local 
prosecutors are elected, and they not only work closely with police to 
investigate and punish crimes, but also often depend on police union 
endorsements to win and keep their jobs.
34
 Thus local prosecutors are 
heavily influenced not to make decisions that would anger those 
unions.
35
 
II. SHARPENING THE TOOL OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION—WHY 
HOLDING OFFICERS CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE MATTERS  
A. A Dearth of Prosecutions Where Appropriate Undermines the 
Rationale of Criminal Punishment 
While all of the methods to address police misconduct have 
shortcomings, a failure to prosecute police officers who may have 
used excessive force has broader implications for the criminal justice 
system. When there is a criminal violation, there are generally two 
overarching theories to justify punishing the offender. Punishment is 
based on either retribution, a “backward” looking theory that is 
focused on the crime itself and emphasizes the concept that the 
 
 30. Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration 
in the Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
489, 501 (citing Jacobi, supra note 29, at 789). 
 31. Jacobi, supra note 29, at 803. 
 32. Id. at 803–04. 
 33. Id. at 803. 
 34. Editorial Board, Reform Prosecuting Police Misconduct: Our View, USA TODAY 
(Dec. 10, 2014 6:37 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/12/10/eric-garner-
staten-island-police-district-attorney-editorials-debates/20216333/. 
 35. Id.  
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offender deserves punishment, or on utilitarianism, which focuses on 
deterring future criminal conduct.
36
  
In regards to police shootings, officers are rarely prosecuted, 
suggesting a sense that the police are often above reproach in such 
situations. A recent Washington Post analysis of fatal police 
shootings between 2005 and 2015, showed that despite thousands of 
shootings, only fifty-four officers were criminally prosecuted.
37
 
Bowling Green State University criminologist Philip M. Stinson and 
The Washington Post identified the fifty-four prosecutions and the 
cases were gleaned from news reports, grand jury announcements and 
news releases from prosecutors.
38
 
More generally, evidence also shows a large disparity between 
officers who are accused of committing crimes, and the number who 
are actually charged or convicted for those crimes. For example, a 
study regarding prosecution of police officers from April 2009 until 
December 2010 showed that during that time 8,300 credible reports 
were filled against nearly 11,000 officers, but of those reports only 
3,238 resulted in criminal charges.
39
 Of those 3,238 officers only 
1,063 officers were convicted, and only 36 percent of those convicted 
were actually incarcerated.
40
 The study provided detailed graphs 
comparing the conviction and incarceration rates of law enforcement 
and the general public. Conviction rates showed that nearly 70 
percent of the general public was convicted, while about 35 percent 
of officers were convicted.
41
 Similarly the incarceration rates showed 
that nearly 70 percent of the general public was incarcerated for their 
crimes, while only about 35 percent of law enforcement officers were 
incarcerated for their crimes.
42
  
 
 36. John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 4–5 (1955). 
 37. Kimberly Kindy & Kimbriell Kelly, Thousands Dead, Few Prosecuted, WASH. POST 
(Apr. 11, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/04/11/thousands-dead-
few-prosecuted/. 
 38. Id.  
 39. David Packman, 2010 NPMSRP Police Misconduct Statistical Report—Draft, CATO 
INST. (Apr. 5, 2011, 12:55 AM), http://www.policemisconduct.net/2010-npmsrp-police-misconduct-
statistical-report/. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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This data revealed similar findings when focusing specifically on 
cases involving excessive force.
43
 The report found that 2,716 
officers were accused of using excessive force, but only about 200 of 
those officers were charged. Of those charged, only 77 officers were 
convicted.
44
 Of the officers accused of using excessive force, 430 
officers were accused of killing a person but only 30 officers were 
charged, and only half of those 30 where convicted.
45
 In some areas, 
police are rarely prosecuted at all. For example, in Florida an officer 
had not been charged with shooting a civilian in twenty years.
46
 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund chief litigator, 
Christina Swarns, argued that in cases of police shootings, the 
interests of prosecutors may not always align with victims, but rather 
with the police they work “‘hand in hand’” with, and has urged 
greater independence.
47
 Notably, from January 2009 through 
November 2011, Chicago had 441 misconduct cases (75 percent were 
excessive force and wrongful arrest cases) that led to paid settlements 
to victims—however not one of those cases led to an indictment or 
conviction, showing that cities rarely wish to admit their 
wrongdoings.
48
 
B. A Failure to Prosecute Officers Undermine Public Confidence in 
Investigations of Officer-Involved Deaths 
Historically, studies have demonstrated shown that when 
compared with their white counterparts, African Americans have less 
confidence in police officers and do not believe that police treat racial 
minorities fairly. A recent Reuters poll shows that only 28 percent of 
African American trust police to be fair and just, while 61 percent of 
whites believe police to be fair and just. These figures elucidate deep 
racial divisions regarding the legitimacy of the criminal justice 
 
 43. Adeshina Emmanuel, Indictments, Convictions of Police Officers in Civilian Deaths 
Rare, CHI. REP. (Nov. 6, 2014), http://chicagoreporter.com/indictments-convictions-police-officers-
civilian-deaths-rare/. 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
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system in the United States. At a time when blacks are 
disproportionately incarcerated, many of whom are jailed for non-
violent drug crimes, it seems anathema to many that a fair and 
impartial justice system would allow police officers to escape 
punishment or condemnation for the violence visited upon unarmed 
racial minorities. As one commentator noted regarding the deaths of 
Brown and Garner, “[b]road cross-sections of the public have lost 
trust in local law enforcement agencies due to their perception of 
biased investigations of such deadly-force incidents.”49  
III. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
In the wake of a number of deaths of unarmed black men at the 
hands of police officers, President Obama appointed the President’s 
Task Force on 21st Century Policing to examine ways in which to 
increase police accountability and promote public safety. The Task 
Force’s report specifically noted that the use of independent 
prosecutors to review “cases of inappropriate deadly force” will help 
to build “mutual trust between community and law enforcement.”50 
A. Independent Investigations 
When there is a death in police custody, many police departments 
conduct an internal investigation. Typically, the results of the 
investigation are disclosed to local prosecutors who will then decide 
whether to pursue criminal charges against the officers involved. 
Internal investigations can be a valuable tool for a police department 
because they not only provide an opportunity for the department to 
learn about how officers behave in certain circumstances, and but a 
properly run division responsible for internal oversight could signal 
to officers that the department takes allegations of misconduct 
seriously. However, these internal police investigations often lack 
transparency, and the public is generally distrustful of allowing 
officers within the same department to investigate their fellow 
 
 49. Katz, supra note 14, at 236–37.  
 50. OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FINAL REPORT 
OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 21 (2015), available at 
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf. 
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officers.
51
 Officers who investigate other officers within the same 
department, even if they are in entirely within the office, face 
inherent conflicts of interest, and may not want to be seen as 
violating the “code of silence” endemic in police culture or breaching 
the loyalty they have to fellow officers.
52
  
Therefore, in addition to internal investigations, state legislation 
should also mandate an independent investigation of deaths in police 
custody. In 2014, Wisconsin became the first state to mandate outside 
investigators with respect to officer-involved shootings.
53
 Currently 
Wisconsin is one of the only states to mandate an independent 
investigation of an officer-involved death. The Wisconsin law 
provides that “each agency shall have a written policy regarding the 
investigation of officer-involved deaths that involve a law 
enforcement officer employed by the law enforcement agency.”54 The 
law further requires an investigation conducted by at least two 
investigators, one of whom is the lead investigator and neither of 
whom is employed by a law enforcement agency that employs a law 
enforcement officer involved in the officer-involved death.”55 While 
 
 51. These investigations are often perceived as illegitimate because of the conflicts of 
interest existing among the officers and those assigned to investigate them. For example, Paul 
Chevigny notes that in the Internal Affairs Division of New York City’s Police Department, 
“[s]uperior officers did not want to root out corruption, both because it might threaten their jobs 
and because they wanted to maintain a good image for the department.” PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE 
OF THE KNIFE: POLICE VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAS 79–80 (1995). The Danziger Bridge 
shooting in the wake of Hurricane Katrina provides one example of how officers in the same 
department failed to properly investigate officers involved in a shooting. After several officers 
shot several unarmed citizens crossing the bridge, the supervisors who were called to 
investigate the scene participated in a cover-up and ultimately faced criminal prosecution 
themselves. See New Orleans Cops Convicted in Post-Katrina Shootings Case, CNN (Aug. 5, 
2011, 3:44 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/CRIME/08/05/louisiana.danziger.bridge.shooting/.  
 52. The blue code of silence also makes it difficult for investigating officers to gather 
information regarding alleged instances of police misconduct. See also Myriam E. Gilles, 
Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering “Custom” in Section 1983 Municipal Liability, 80 
B.U. L. REV. 17, 84–85 (2000) (discussing the lack of cooperation experienced by police 
officers investigating their fellow officers). 
 53. See In Wisconsin, a Decade Old Shooting Leads to New Law, NPR (Dec. 15, 2014, 
1:27 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/12/13/370592433/in-wisconsin-a-decade-old-police-shooting-
leads-to-new-law; See also Candice Bernd, Wisconsin Passes First State Law Requiring 
Independent Investigations of Police Custody Deaths, TRUTHOUT (May 3, 2014, 9:10 AM), 
http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/23463-wisconsin-passes-first-state-law-requiring-independent-
investigations-of-police-custody-deaths. 
 54. See A.B. 409 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2013).  
 55. Id.  
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many local jurisdictions follow a similar protocol regarding deaths in 
custody, Wisconsin is one of the only states to currently mandate that 
an independent body investigate these deaths.
56
  
In October 2014, state legislator Reed Gusciora introduced similar 
legislation in New Jersey.
57
 Many states already use state agencies 
such as the State Bureau of Investigation or the Attorney General’s 
office to take responsibility for the investigation but do not require 
that these agencies take responsibility for the investigation of officer 
involved uses of force or death. Connecticut also has an independent 
prosecutor law. This law requires that the state’s Division of Criminal 
Justice investigate any police-involved death and allows the state’s 
chief attorney to appoint a special prosecutor if he or she sees fit.
58
 
Missouri Senator Jamilah Nasheed and Missouri Representative Jay 
Barnes have offered legislation that would require a special 
prosecutor to head up all investigations of police-involved deaths.
59
 
On July 8, New York Governor, Andrew Cuomo, at the request of 
New York’s Attorney General, Eric Schneiderman, issued Executive 
Order No. 147, which appoints the New York State Attorney General 
as a special prosecutor in matters relating to the deaths of unarmed 
civilians caused by law enforcement officers. This order will also 
allow the special prosecutor to review cases where there is a question 
whether the civilian was armed and dangerous at the time of his or 
her death.
60
 Thus, the order does not cover all police killings, but only 
those where a suspect was unarmed or whether there was a question 
about whether the suspect was armed.
61
 After the announcement, 
 
 56. Holly Yan & Ashley Fantz, Police Kill Teen: Why Wisconsin’s Investigation Will Be 
Different, CNN (Mar. 10, 2015, 12:48 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/10/us/wisconsin-
police-shooting-rules/. 
 57. The New Jersey Law requires “two independent persons to investigate an act or 
mission by a police officer, which directly results in the death of an individual.” A. 3756, 216th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2014). Those individuals must be, “employed by the county prosecutor of 
a county other than where the fatal incident occurred.” Id.  
 58. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-277(a) (2012). 
 59. Mike Lear, MO Rep, Sen Want Special Prosecutors in All Police Shootings, 
MISSOURINET (Oct. 13, 2014), http://www.missourinet.com/2014/10/13/two-mo-lawmakers-
want-special-prosecutors-in-all-officer-involved-shootings/. 
 60. Noah Remnick, Cuomo’s Order for Special Prosecutor in Police Deaths Is Criticized, 
July 9, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/09/nyregion/cuomos-order-for-special-prosecutor-
in-police-deaths-is-criticized.html.  
 61. Id. 
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critics were quick to note concerns about whether “that there will be 
pressure on a special prosecutor to indict an officer for the sake of 
public perception and that does not serve the ends of justice.”62 
B. Models of Independent Prosecutors  
Even once an investigation is complete, there still exists the 
question as to whether the officer(s) involved in the shooting will 
face criminal prosecution, and there are many hurdles to securing 
criminal convictions for officers accused of excessive uses of force. 
The first step often involves the local prosecutor’s decision whether 
to charge the officer with a crime. As with all criminal cases, the 
prosecutor enjoys wide (and often unfettered) discretion regarding 
whether to impose criminal charges.
63
 Prosecutors and police officers 
work as part of the same team and inevitably develop a close 
relationship—prosecutors rely on police officers to investigate cases, 
interrogate suspects, and testify at trial, and police officers rely on 
prosecutors to turn their arrests into convictions.
64
 Put simply, 
prosecutors need the cooperation of the police to win cases. Thus 
prosecutors may face a conflict of interest because it may be difficult 
for them to bring successful prosecutions if they have to send their 
key witnesses, the police officers, to prison for an officer-involved 
death.
65
 Therefore, it may be unrealistic to expect even the best 
district attorney to remain unbiased when they have to prosecute a 
police officer.
66
 
Given that local prosecutors will rely heavily upon police officers 
within the same department to assist with their investigation of other 
 
 62. Jospeh Schatt, NY Governor Names Special Prosecutor for Killings by Police, CNN 
(July 9, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/09/us/new-york-special-prosecutor/ (quoting 
Patrick Lynch, head of the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association). 
 63. See Rachel Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 
121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1351–53 (2007-08) (discussing how courts do not review 
prosecutorial charging decisions).  
 64. Paul Butler, Op-Ed., The System Must Counteract Prosecutors’ Natural Sympathies 
for Cops, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/12/04/do-
cases-like-eric-garners-require-a-special-prosecutor/the-system-must-counteract-prosecutors-
natural-sympathies-for-cops 
 65. Id. 
 66. Letitia James, Prosecutors and Police: The Inherent Conflict in Our Courts, MSNBC 
(Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/prosecutors-police-inherent-conflict-our-courts. 
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cases, inherent conflicts of interest exist.
67
 Similarly, many local 
District Attorneys are elected, and prosecuting police officers might 
damage their reputation with a large part of the electorate. Many of 
their endorsements come from law enforcement unions, which could 
impact their chances for reelection.
68
 Even though prosecutors have 
an ethical obligation to ignore such considerations, the risk that these 
apparent conflicts may play a role in their decision or ability to 
effectively prosecute the case against an officer too great to ignore.
69
  
In addition to prosecutions under state law, the federal 
government also has the ability to prosecute officers who are accused 
of excessive uses of force pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 242. Section 242 
provides that it is unlawful for a person acting “under color of any 
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, [to] willfully subject [] 
any inhabitant of any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession or 
District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities 
secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United 
States.”70 While the possibility of federal intervention removes the 
local prosecutor, and thus the conflict of interest, federal officials 
have agreed that state prosecution is the preferred avenue for criminal 
prosecutions of law enforcement officers, and therefore federal 
intervention should serve only as a “back-stop.”71 Accordingly, 
 
 67. See Jacobi, supra note 29, at 803. 
 68. William Lynch III, Why We Need Independent Prosecutors, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 
27, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/-william-lynch-iii/why-we-need-independent-p_b_ 
7153826.html. For example, the Staten Island District Attorney, Daniel Donovan received 
campaign donations from a number of organizations closely connected with law enforcement 
including the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association, the Detectives’ Endowment Association, the 
Sergeants Benevolent Association, the  Captains Endowment Association, the Lieutenants 
Benevolent Association, the Correction Officers Benevolent Association, the Bridge and 
Tunnels Superior Officers Council, the Bridge and Tunnel Officers Benevolent Association, 
and the Fraternal Order of Police. Id.  
 69. This issue was of particular concern in the Michael Brown shooting. In this case, 
many community members believed that the prosecutors’ ties to law enforcement were too 
close and the apparent conflicts of interest delegitimized his role from the beginning. Elizabeth 
Chuck, Prosecutor in Michael Brown Case Has Deep Family Ties to Police, NBC NEWS (Aug. 
20, 2014, 10:18 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/michael-brown-shooting/prosecutor-
michael-brown-case-has-deep-family-ties-police-n183911. 
 70. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2000). 
 71. See Police Brutality: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional 
Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 3 (1991) (recording testimony of John R. 
Dunne, then-Assistant Att’y Gen., Civ. Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice).  
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federal prosecutions for excessive force are extremely rare, and local 
prosecutors thereby retain exclusive control over the vast majority 
cases against police officers accused of excessive force.
72
  
Given these inherent conflicts of interest, in order to assure public 
confidence in criminal proceedings involving police officers and 
deadly uses of force, reformers have called for the appointment of 
“special prosecutors” or “independent prosecutors” to prosecute these 
cases at the local level.
73
 There are several models of independent 
prosecution that might achieve greater confidence regarding criminal 
prosecutions of officers who are accused of excessive uses of force. 
First, similar to independent investigations of such cases, many states 
already have rules that allow the State Attorney General or another 
independent body to prosecute controversial cases.
74
 States could 
pass legislation that would mandate automatic referral of all such 
cases to an independent or special prosecutor, instead of relying on 
the discretion of authorities to determine which cases a special 
prosecutor will hear.
75
 According to Congressional Research Services 
legal analysis, Connecticut is one of the only states that currently 
requires the appointment of a special prosecutor in police-related 
deadly use of force incidents, but other states’ lawmakers are quickly 
moving to introduce similar legislation.
76
 For example, a 
 
 72. The Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division, during President Obama’s 
administration, prosecuted 385 police officers for civil rights violations. Bob Egelko, Obama 
Team More Likely Than Predecessors to Prosecute Police, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 21, 2014, 7:56 
AM), http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Obama-team-more-likely-than-predecessors-to-5702851. 
php. In addition to the infrequency of federal prosecutions, is also notoriously difficult to secure 
successful prosecutions in federal cases because the federal law requires the prosecutor to 
establish the officer “willfully” violated the victim’s rights, which is a high burden to 
demonstrate. See 18 U.S.C. § 242.  
 73. See also The Editorial Board Police Abuse Cases Need Special Prosecutors, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 6, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/police-abuse-cases-need-special-
prosecutors/2014/12/06/fcf57e28-7cd6-11e4-b821-503cc7efed9e_story.html. 
 74. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 147 (N.Y. 2015), available at https://www.governor.ny. 
gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/EO147.pdf. A recent Editorial in the New York 
Times called this model the “best solution.” The Editorial Board, A Crisis of Confidence in 
Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/09/opinion/a-crisis-
of-confidence-in-prosecutors.html?_r=0 [hereinafter Crisis in Confidence]  
 75. Crisis in Confidence, supra note 74.  
 76. Special Prosecutors: Investigations and Prosecutions of Police Use of Deadly Force, 
FAS.ORG (Dec. 12, 2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/specpro.pdf (citing CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 51-277(a) (2012)). See also Haygood to Seek Independent Prosecutor for Deadly-
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Pennsylvania lawmaker plans to introduce legislation that would 
require the state attorney general to appoint an independent special 
prosecutor whenever a police officer is involved in a deadly force 
incident.
77
 
Another option would be for states to establish permanent 
independent prosecutors offices and pass legislation that would allow 
authorities to refer officer-involved fatalities to this office for 
investigation and/or prosecution. This option seems less viable for 
some jurisdictions because establishing a separate office to review 
these cases might seem inefficient if the area has an infrequent 
amount of police-related deaths. This option, however, might be an 
attractive option for larger municipalities that experience multiple 
officer-involved fatalities per year. 
C. Critiquing the Independent Prosecutor Model 
While many believe that the appointment of independent 
prosecutors is necessary to ensure an unbiased and fair investigation, 
there are others who question whether independent prosecutors will 
indeed remain independent.
78
 Some observers have noted that by 
their very nature, prosecutors may be limited by an “us-versus-them” 
viewpoint.
79
 Similarly, some district attorneys have vocally opposed 
the idea of independent prosecutors, stating that as district attorney, 
they would not hesitate to prosecute an officer to the fullest extent of 
the law and that remaining independent in spite of political pressures 
is, in fact, the purpose of electing a district attorney.
80
 Critics of 
 
Force Incidents, PA SENATE (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.pasenate.com/2014/12/19/haywood-to-
seek-independent-prosecutor-for-deadly-force-incidents/ [hereinafter Independent Prosecutor]. 
 77. Independent Prosecutor, supra note 76. 
 78. Delores Jones-Brown, Special Prosecutors are Useful, but Not a Guarantee Against 
Prejudice, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2014, 2:58 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/ 
12/04/do-cases-like-eric-garners-require-a-special-prosecutor/special-prosecutors-are-useful-but 
-not-a-guarantee-against-prejudice. 
 79. Id.  
 80. See, e.g., Larry Miller, Use of Independent Prosecutors Bothers Philly D.A., PHILA. 
TRIB. (Mar. 5, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.phillytrib.com/news/use-of-independent-
prosecutors-bothers-philly-d-a/article_b7642718-b5a7-5b6a-bd13-cc8abb6148a0.html; and Jeff 
Rosen, The Role of Prosecutors in Officer-Involved Shootings, SANTA CLARA U. MARKKULA 
CENTER FOR APPLIED ETHICS, http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/focusareas/government_ 
ethics/prosecutor-role.html (last visited May 27, 2015). 
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independent prosecutors have also noted that it would be wrong to 
blame the prosecutor for the grand jury’s decision not to indict.81 It is 
ultimately up to the grand jury to decide the officer’s fate, and it is 
not the prosecutor’s fault if a jury gives the officer the benefit of the 
doubt.
82
 
There is historical precedent for appointing independent 
prosecutors to maintain the integrity of criminal investigation or 
prosecution where actual or potential conflicts of interest might exist. 
Unfortunately, several high-profile cases in which a special 
prosecutor was appointed remind us that this model is also 
susceptible to abuse. Appointing an independent prosecutor has been 
the subject of controversy since Richard Nixon’s Watergate 
scandal.
83
 While independent prosecutors date back to 1875, the most 
notable instance of the use of a special prosecutor is in the aftermath 
of Watergate.
84
 After the public lost trust in the government, 
Congress enacted the Independent Counsel Act in 1978, which called 
for the use of a special prosecutor any time allegations were brought 
against high officials in the executive branch, including the President 
and his cabinet members.
85
 The Independent Counsel Act, amidst 
criticism, was upheld as constitutional.
86
 Those who lauded the Act 
suggested that it helped “uncover the truth behind allegations of 
criminal wrongdoing,” and ensured accountability.87 Others believe 
that the Act “vindicated the public trust” in the system to conduct fair 
investigations.
88
 Still others have suggested that it helped maintain 
the system of checks and balances, because otherwise, “members of 
 
 81. Heather MacDonald, Op-Ed., District Attorneys Have Shown They Can Prosecute 
Police, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2015, 10:42 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/ 
12/04/do-cases-like-eric-garners-require-a-special-prosecutor/district-attorneys-have-shown-they-
can-prosecute-police. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Alexander I. Tachmes, Independent Counsels Under the Ethics in Government Act of 
1978: A Violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine or an Essential Check on Executive 
Power?, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 735, 736 (1988). 
 84. Donald C. Smaltz, The Independent Counsel Act: A View From Inside, 86 GEO. L.J. 
2307, 2310–11 (1998). 
 85. Id. at 2310, 2320. 
 86. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 87. Smaltz, supra note 84, at 2368.  
 88. John Q. Barrett, Independent Counsel Law Improvements for the Next Five Years, 51 
ADMIN. L. REV. 631, 635–36 (1999). 
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the executive branch will be responsible for the prosecution of other 
executive officers, a stark a conflict of interest.”89  
The Independent Counsel Act provided that the Attorney General 
can launch a preliminary investigation against any person covered by 
the Act who may have violated federal criminal law.
90
 Those covered 
under the Act include the President, Vice President, the CIA Director, 
members of Congress, and other high-ranking officials.
91
 If the 
Attorney General believes that further investigation is needed, he or 
she can call for the appointment of independent counsel.
92
 The 
independent counsel has authority to fully investigate and prosecute 
the matter.
93
 Their investigative and prosecutorial duties include 
proceedings before a grand jury, court proceedings and litigation, 
appealing court decisions, and reviewing evidence.
94
 After Kenneth 
Starr’s controversial investigation of Clinton after the Monica 
Lewinsky scandal, there were calls to reform the statute.
95
 One 
commentator noted that “To the horror of civil libertarians and 
others, Starr and his cohorts engaged in brutal tactics in their quest 
for the scalp of a sitting president” and noted that it was “unlikely 
that a ‘regular’ federal prosecutor, as opposed to this ‘special one,’ 
could’ve gotten away with such a rampage through due process, 
fairness and ordinary decency.”96 In 1999, Congress allowed the 
statute to lapse and there is currently no federal independent 
prosecutor’s statute.97  
Similarly, Heather MacDonald notes particular difficulties that 
occurred in the context of special prosecutors appointed to prosecute 
 
 89. Tachmes, supra note 83, at 764. 
 90. 28 U.S.C. § 591(a) (1994). 
 91. Id. § 591(b)-(c). 
 92. Id. § 592(c). 
 93. Id. § 593(b)(3). 
 94. Id. § 594(a) (2012). See also Jack Maskell, The Independent Counsel Law, 45 FED. 
LAW. 28, 34 (1998) (discussing the provisions of the Act).  
 95. Joseph S. Hall, Nicholas Pullen & Kandace Rayos, Independent Counsel 
Investigations, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 809, 814 (1999). 
 96. Harvey Silvergate, Op-Ed., A Special Prosecutor Is a Bad Idea with Unintended 
Consequences, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2014, 2:58 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/ 
2014/12/04/do-cases-like-eric-garners-require-a-special-prosecutor/a-special-prosecutor-is-a-bad-
idea-with-unanticipated-consequences. 
 97. 28 U.S.C. § 599 (1994). 
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police and argues that the “narrow mandate can lead to abuse.”98 
Specifically, she recalls that in the wake of the Knapp Commission’s 
findings of endemic corruption within the New York Police 
Department. New York State created a special prosecutor to 
prosecute officers involved in misconduct.
99
 In this instance, while 
many felt that local prosecutors could not fairly prosecute officers 
because of their close relationships, the plan backfired, and 
“overzealous tactics” by the special prosecutor led to the reversal of 
convictions based on entrapment and other improper tactics.
100
 She 
also suggests that “[t]he threat of being displaced by a special 
prosecutor can also undermine a district attorney’s independence” 
when politically or ideologically motivated.
101
 This serves as a 
reminder of the thin line that such prosecutors must walk in these 
situations.  
CONCLUSION 
Standing alone, there is no single remedy that will eliminate 
police misconduct. An entire mosaic of reforms will be necessary to 
resolve some of the complex issues surrounding police reform in 
order to restore the legitimacy that currently is clearly lacking in 
many communities. But each tile in the mosaic must be strong and 
intact. Strengthening the models of criminal prosecution, by ensuring 
that investigations and subsequent prosecutions are conducted 
without actual or even the appearance of conflicts of interest will be 
an integral step in increasing the legitimacy of the process. Yet, 
appointing an independent prosecutor is not a panacea and policy 
makers must address numerous issues to assess viable alternatives to 
local prosecutors. For example, for any proposal to appoint a special 
prosecutor, policy makers must address several important questions 
about the authority of the prosecutor and the structure and staffing of 
such an entity. First, what conditions would trigger the appointment 
 
 98. MacDonald, supra note 81. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
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of a special prosecutor?
102
 Would referral be automatic or within the 
discretion of a local authority (e.g., the local DA herself, or another 
judicial official)? Furthermore, would the independent prosecutor be 
available only for officer-involved fatalities or other allegations of 
uses of force? Finally, policymakers must consider what types of 
qualifications this independent prosecutor should possess. Would a 
local prosecutor currently working in a neighboring jurisdiction 
suffice or, by virtue of their position, would they experience the same 
apparent or actual conflicts of interest that a prosecutor in the same 
jurisdiction? Would a cadre of retired prosecutors staff the office, 
particularly if the jurisdiction experienced only a small number of 
triggering incidents. These questions deserve further study in order to 
effectively restore trust and reduce police violence. 
 
 102. See generally JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INDEPENDENT COUNSELS, 
SPECIAL PROSECUTORS, SPECIAL COUNSELS, AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS (2013), available at 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43112.pdf. 
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